








Justification rather than truth: Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s defence of positive religion in the ring-parable​[1]​
Introduction on positive religion 
Positive religion is not held in high esteem since the time of the Enlightenment. Then its claims, e.g. revelatory claims or claims to absolute, i.e. unique validity​[2]​, were considered to be incapable of being historically verifiable or to contradict rationality, moral as well as cognitive rationality. Regarding the latter, the criticism was that since positive religious claims go beyond what is possible to know, their truth cannot be fixed. Globally speaking, three fashions of reducing or even rejecting positive religion prevailed then: Positive religion could be reduced to morality – the fashion particularly prevalent in the ‘German’ (i.e. Prussia and surrounding countries) version of the Enlightenment (see also below, section 3). Or, it could be reduced to natural religion, to deistic and similar doctrines – particularly prevalent in the English version of the Enlightenment. Or, it could be straightforwardly rejected in the spirit of an all-out atheism – the fashion particularly prevalent in the French version of the Enlightenment​[3]​. 
And positive religion’s stakes have not improved much since the time of the Enlightenment. To be sure, we are not as easily inclined to reduce positive religion to natural religion as our ‘Enlightened’ forefathers were. But only because religious claims have fallen into disrepute on a global scale, natural and positive alike. It seems that the most we can hope for in the wake of the Bultmann-school, or, more radical, death of God-theologies, is some form of demythologised, existentially interpreted (i.e. reconstructed) positive religion. 
To be sure, there are the believers who embrace positive religious claims no matter what. But they pay a heavy price for their stance by sacrificing those insights and intellectual virtues that have become commonplace in Western modernity, e.g. regarding the necessity of critical thinking, autonomous thinking (as opposed to tradition-bound thinking) etc. In my eyes, sacrificing those intellectual virtues is as dissatisfying as the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment rejection or reduction of positive religion is. 
In the interpretation suggested below, Lessing provides a way out of the dilemma between either uncritical thinking and reducing/rejecting positive religion. He comes up with a way that enables the believer to maintain ‘positive’ religious claims while being able to maintain her intellectual integrity. His way out of this dilemma is to contend that believers have an epistemic right to maintain positive religious claims although they are uncertain as to their truth. In other words, they do not have to overstep the limits of what is humanly possible to know in order to maintain positive religion. 
	The problem how competing positive religions can exist side by side will be the example with the help of which the problem of positive religion will be tackled in the following. Lessing deals with that problem most distinctly in his theatre play ‘Nathan the Wise’​[4]​. I will analyse it, more precisely, its famous ring-parable, in the following fashion: First, I will sketch different interpretations of the solution provided in the ring-parable. I will suggest an interpretation, which avoids the reductions and rejections of positive religion mentioned above (chapter 1). Second, I will show that Lessing’s solution that we can be epistemically justified in holding positive religious claims although their truth is not fixed is philosophically tenable (chapter 2). Third, I will show that focussing on the question of the justification of religious claims rather than that of their truth has certain advantages for the pursuit of the philosophy of religion. By doing that, Lessing is in good company, viz. in the company of e.g. William James and Alvin Plantinga (chapter 3). 
I) Different types of interpretations of the ring-parable: Sketch and Evaluation
1) Summary of the ring parable
The ring-parable is situated right in the centre of ‘Nathan’, thus indicating its importance within the overall story. Let me summarize it as well as its background. 
‘Nathan’ is situated in Jerusalem, at the time of the crusades. Three religions exist side-by-side, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The successful Muslim leader, sultan Saladin, has spent all his money on his military campaigns as well as on acts of generosity towards his people. He invites a rich and wise Jew, ‘Nathan’, to his palace in order to approach him for money. In order to enact pressure upon him and also to test his wisdom, the sultan asks him which of the three religions is the true one. Nathan responds with the ring-parable, which goes as follows.
There existed a ring, which had spectacular qualities to it. For example, ‘whoso wore it, trusting therein, found grace with God and man’.​[5]​ It was supposed to go from its holder to the hand of his most beloved son. At some point, however, a man possessed that ring who had three sons whom he loved all dearly. He could not decide to whom the ring should go. Thus, he made two duplicates of that ring. At his dying hour, he called upon his three sons separately and gave each of them a ring. After their father’s death, all three sons claimed to possess the true ring. Recognizing that their brothers had an identical ring, they consulted a judge in order to settle the matter. 
The judge’s verdict is crucial for interpreting the ring-parable and is commonly conceived of as containing the solution to its problem, viz. how competing religions can co-exist. Thus, I quote the judge’s words in full length: 
‘Thus spake the Judge: Bring me the father here 
To witness; I will hear him; and if not
Leave then my judgment seat.  Think you this chair  
Is set for reading of riddles?  Do you wait,
Expecting the true ring to open mouth?
Yet halt!  I hear, the genuine ring possesses 
The magic power to bring its wearer love 
And grace with God and man.  That must decide; 
For never can the false rings have this virtue.
Well, then; say, whom do two of you love best?
Come, speak! What! Silent! Is the rings’ effect
But backward and not outward? Is it so 
That each one loves himself most?  Then I judge
All three of you are traitors and betrayed!
Your rings all three are false.  The genuine ring 
Perchance the father lost, and to replace it
And hide the loss, had three rings made for one…
So, went on the Judge,
You may not seek my counsel, but my verdict;
But go! My counsel is, you take the thing
Exactly as it lies.  If each of you
Received his ring from his good father’s hand,
Then each of you believe his ring the true one-
‘Tis possible the father would not suffer 
Longer the one ring tyrannise in’s house,
Certain, he loved all three, and equal loved,
And would not injure two to favour one.
Well, then, let each one strive most zealously
To show a love untainted by self-care,
Each with his might vie with the rest to bring
Into the day the virtue of the jewel
His finger wears, and help this virtue forth
By gentleness, by spirit tractable,
By kind deeds and true piety towards God;
And when in days to come the magic powers 
Of these fair rings among your children’s children
Brighten the world, I call you once again,
After a thousand thousand years are lapsed,
Before this seat of judgment. On that day
A wiser man shall sit on it and speak.
Depart!  So spake the modest Judge.’​[6]​
2) Sketch of the different interpretations of the judge’s verdict/counsel 
It is hardly contested among Lessing-scholars that the judge’s verdict/counsel at the end of the ring-parable provides the key to interpreting it. Yet, it is well contested what this verdict consists of. There are legions of interpretations of the ring-parable and I cannot repeat them here in detail.​[7]​ Let it thus suffice to sketch three different types of interpretations and then evaluate them. 
Interpretation alternative 1): The atheist reading
In truth, all three rings are lost, thus, religion is a ‘lost cause’. This interpretation receives support from the judge’s earlier verdict: 
‘All three of you are traitors and betrayed!
Your rings all three are false.  The genuine ring 
Perchance the father lost, and to replace it
And hide the loss, had three rings made for one’.
‘Your rings all three are false’ means on the non-symbolic level that all three religions at stake are false, mistaken, or ‘fake’ - and, we may add from our current, more global perspective, the same holds for religious claims not belonging to the three Abrahamitic religions at stake here. They are mistaken as well. In short, according to this interpretation, all religions are ‘fake’. 
Naturally, the ‘atheist’ reading of Lessing favours this interpretation. It implies not only that religion is false but also that it is treacherous- the three brothers claiming the validity of their respective claim are, besides being ‘betrayed’ themselves, all ‘traitors’ according to the judge’s verdict​[8]​. The natural by-product of this atheist interpretation is that all ‘missionary’ impulses inherent in positive religion are repressed. If all religions are ‘fake’, then, obviously, we have no right to universalise the claims implied in any of them. 
Interpretation alternative 2, the theist reading: I come now to an interpretation alternative, which reads Lessing’s solution theistically. This interpretation can be split up into two subtypes, 2a) and 2b). Before I delve into their differences, however, I will point out what they have in common, thus, what distinguishes them from the atheist interpretation. 
This solution implies that the question which of the three religions is the true one is here and now indeed non-decidable. But whatever follows from this hic et nunc non-decidability does not discredit the religious pursuit as such. This solution receives support not from the judge’s earlier verdict but from his later counsel:
‘My counsel is, you take the thing
Exactly as it lies.  If each of you
Received his ring from his good father’s hand,
Then each of you believe his ring the true one-
‘Tis possible the father would not suffer 
Longer the one ring tyrannise in’s house,
Certain, he loved all three, and equal loved,
And would not injure two to favour one’.
The certainty that the father ‘loved all three, and equal loved, And would not injure two to favour one’ is contrasted with a possibility, viz. a possible explanation or conjecture of the non-decidability of the truth of religion
‘Tis possible the father would not suffer 
Longer the one ring tyrannise in’s house’. 
Independently of the question as to whether this particular conjecture holds or not, the judge goes on to say ‘My counsel is, you take the thing exactly as it lies’. In other words, the religious pursuit can be practically ‘enacted’ in the moral domain and is logically independent of the question of its truth: 
‘Well, then, let each one strive most zealously
To show a love untainted by self-care,
Each with his might vie with the rest to bring
Into the day the virtue of the jewel
His finger wears, and help this virtue forth
By gentleness, by spirit tractable,
By kind deeds and true piety towards God’.
The point to grasp is that, in this interpretation, it is legitimate to continue with one’s religious pursuit: ‘Then each of you believe his ring the true one’. Every follower of one of the three religions and, by extension, of other religions as well is, at least, prima facie epistemically justified in maintaining her belief. In this perspective, the moral admonitions can serve as a criterion to distinguish between truly legitimate and illegitimate religious perspectives. For example, one could argue that ‘a love untainted by self-care’ and the other moral admonitions could serve to distinguish legitimate religious pursuits from illegitimate ones. 
	Within this type of explanation, two subtypes can be distinguished. I come now to Interpretation alternative 2), subtype a): The reduction of religion to morality.
The religious claims implied in the ring-parable are cognitively non-decidable, i.e. it is non-decidable which religious truth claims are valid and which are not. But the cognitive dimension can be bypassed in religious matters. Thus, different from solution 1), it does not follow the illegitimacy of the religious pursuit as such but, rather, the more limited claim of the illegitimacy of the cognitive component implied in it. That is to say, the cognitive is to be substituted by the moral in religious matters and that allows for a principled legitimacy of the religious pursuit. This interpretation can be captured in the maxim: ‘Let us forget about the truth claims implied in religion and focus on its moral dimension instead. That way we can uphold it (even in the face of its modern critique)’. 
This interpretation shows some commonality with ‘non-cognitive’ reconstructions of religious utterances (e.g. R. Braithwaite’s​[9]​) and, more broadly, with those attempts to reconstruct religion in purely moral terms which have risen in our Western cultures in response to the modern challenges of religion. Those attempts sacrifice religion’s cognitive dimension but hold on to its moral dimension. Another example of those attempts is the move to cling to a pacifist morality - allegedly being implied in the Scriptures, say, the Sermon on the Mount - while the cognitive background that led to its formulation in the Scriptures - say, an eschatology of ‘Naherwartung’ - is given up. In this popular move, the cognitive dimension of Christianity is sacrificed at the expense of its moral dimension.   
	Interpretation alternative 2), subtype b): The cognitive dimension being maintained in spite of its non-decidability. 
The cognitive non-decidability of religious claims does not entail that their cognitive dimension should be abrogated and substituted by the moral one. All that follows from this cognitive non-decidability is that there is no such thing as truth proper in religion. But that does not entail that there are no other interesting things to be said about the cognitive dimension of religion, e.g. regarding the question of its justification (see below, section 7). 
This point can be distinguished into two further sub-points, viz. that, i), the non-decidability in religious questions is a principled one; in this case, you will have to interpret the time-phrases ‘days to come’ (of the ‘magic powers’), the ‘children’s children’, and, above all, the famous phrase ‘After a thousand thousand years are lapsed’ as symbolic ones. They are not to be taken literally but are meant to indicate the principled incapability of coming to a reasonable decision on the issue. Also, you will have to interpret the utterance ‘On that day a wiser man shall sit on it and speak’ not to be meant literally. In short, you will have to insist that all of those utterances do not point to the possibility of overcoming the current non-decidability but are ways of prolonging it into eternity without saying it bluntly. 
The alternative, ii), is to understand the current non-decidability not as a principled one but leave, at least, the possibility open that at some point in history what is now non-decidable will become decidable. In this interpretation, you can take the above mentioned phrases more or less literally​[10]​, the upshot being the possibility that the question of the truth of religion will be decided in a time to come. Since the argument suggested below is compatible with both options, I will not decide between them in the following​[11]​. 
3) Evaluation of the different solutions
Let me briefly evaluate the different solutions.
Solution 1), the ‘atheist’ interpretation, fails not only because it is incompatible with (most of) Lessing’s other writings​[12]​ but also because it is difficult to maintain on text-internal grounds. The brothers and the judge have indeed no clue as to what the truth of the matter is, as to whether the one ‘true’ ring is lost or not. But Lessing introduces different perspectives to the ring-parable. He introduces a perspective which is situated above the brothers’ and the judge’s perspective. Let’s call it the ‘reader’s perspective’. Here, more information is provided. This is particularly clear if we look at the beginning of the ring-parable. 
Before coming to the judge’s verdict/counsel, the reader gets to know that the father asked the artist ‘To make him on the model of his ring Two others’​[13]​. That is to say, the true ring serves as the model and the artist makes two copies. But if the true ring were lost and the father had made two copies only, he would obviously fall short of one ring to give to his three sons. Thus, the reader has no reason to assume that the true ring is lost. Furthermore, the reader has read that ‘Even the father scarcely can distinguish His pattern-ring’​[14]​. This utterance presupposes that there is such a thing as a pattern-ring, thus, that it is not lost. In short, for the reader, there is no reason to assume that the true ring is lost. Thus, the interpretation according to which the true ring is lost and all rings are ‘fake’, i.e. all religions are ‘fake’, cannot be supported on a textual basis​[15]​. 
Thus, given the alternative provided above, the theist type of interpretation is to be preferred. It implies that whatever follows from the hic et nunc non-decidability of the question which of the three religions is true does not discredit the religious pursuit as such. This being the case, the question emerges which of the different possible interpretations within solution 2) is to be preferred. 
Let me begin by discussing alternative 2a), according to which the religious is upheld but reconstructed in solely moral terms.  
This interpretation receives ‘geistesgeschichtlichen’ support from the fact that the ‘German’ version of the Enlightenment has in general a strong tendency towards emphasizing the moral dimension in religion (see also above, Introduction). If we look at the person who is - next to Lessing - the representative of the German Enlightenment, Kant, we find him undermining all (robust) cognitive religious claims by criticizing the proofs for the existence of God and by relegating the notion of God into the realm of the ‘ideas of reason’ (together with the notions of the soul and the world). That is to say, in the cognitive domain, religious claims fulfil only some sort of meta-function - such as providing an ultimate unity for experience. Yet, they do not belong to the ‘categories of mind’ proper and sense-experience does not correspond with them. But, after having undermined their cognitive import, Kant ‘resuscitates’ religious ideas in the moral domain, viz. through his famous ‘proof’ that the idea of God is a necessary postulate for the pursuit of a robust form of morality​[16]​. 
Since Lessing wrote his ‘Nathan’ roughly at the same time and in a similar intellectual environment in which Kant did​[17]​, it is well conceivable that both entertained the same sort of ideas. Thus, it is not far-fetched to assume that Lessing undermines the cognitive dimension of religion and ‘resuscitates’ it on the moral level.
Is this interpretation correct? Yes and no. To some extent, Lessing shares the moral tendency characteristic of the German Enlightenment. For example, in the judge’s counsel quoted above, he emphasizes moral categories, such as ‘a love untainted by self-care’ and ‘kind deeds’. This shows that moral categories are indeed important. Furthermore, it can be argued that the whole of ‘Nathan’ has a moral tone to it. This comes out e.g. in the religious ‘conversion’ Nathan’s daughter, Recha, undergoes when she switches from a ‘religion of fancy’ (‘schwärmerische Religion’) to a ‘religion of the deed’ (‘Religion der Tat’)​[18]​.
But although Lessing emphasizes the moral dimension of religion to some extent, he does not reduce religion to it. Holding such a position would be difficult to square with Lessing’s other writings. They convey clearly that, although he seriously wrestles with the cognitive aspect of religion and re-interprets it where he thinks necessary, he does not abrogate it. Rather, he tries to make sense of it one-way or the other. For example, he wrestles with the notion of revelation seriously and attempts to reconstruct it without, however, abandoning it​[19]​.
Furthermore, if you look for text-internal grounds, you will have to judge that, although the judge’s words contain some allusions to morality, it is nowhere clearly suggested that the cognitive should be abrogated in favour of the moral in religion. In short, although interpretation 2a), according to which Lessing abrogates the cognitive dimension of religion entirely and reconstructs it on purely moral grounds, has some plausibility to it, it is on balance not fully convincing. 
Given the above alternatives, we are left with possibility 2b), viz. that the cognitive non-decidability of religious claims does not entail that their cognitive dimension should be abrogated (difference with interpretation alternative 2a), let alone that religion as such should be abrogated (difference with the atheist alternative, 1). We are thus left with the solution that religious claims are indeed non-decidable, yet, they should not be abrogated in an atheist fashion, nor reduced in a moralist fashion. The question what this solution implies precisely and how it can be theoretically underpinned will be answered in the following section.   
4) Explanation of the fact that the judge’s words contain two very different solutions to the problem of positive religion
It was suggested above that the judge’s words contain the solution to the problem of positive religion. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that they provide two rather different solutions, one contained in the verdict, the other in the counsel. The verdict is rather harsh: The judge demands the impossible - ‚bring me the father here to witness’; he ridicules the three brothers although each of them is subjectively entitled to his claim to possessing the true ring - ‘do you wait, expecting the true ring to open mouth?; and he concludes that since each of them loves himself best, all three are ‘traitors and betrayed’. In short, positive religious claims, i.e. claims to absoluteness as they are exemplified in the brother’s claims, are rejected here.
The counsel, however, is much milder. Here, the judge recognizes that all three brothers are subjectively entitled to their respective claims – ‘each of you received his ring from his good father’s hand. Then each of you believe his ring the true one’; he adds a moral admonition – ‘gentleness,… kind deeds’; and he finishes with an allusion to wisdom in times to come – ‘on that day a wiser man shall sit on it [the judge’s chair] and speak’. In short, a milder, wiser perspective is offered here which tries to make sense of positive religious claims.
How to explain the curious fact that this mild counsel is mentioned right next to the harsh verdict?​[20]​ The best explanation is in my eyes that both are the most salient options for Lessing. That is to say, he mentions in an almost Kierkegaardian manner both in the same breath since both are ‘live’ options for him. The first, the harsh verdict, represents the standard Enlightenment criticism of positive religion. According to it, positive religion and its claims, e.g. absolutist claims, are to be straightforwardly rejected. Lessing, being a child of the Enlightenment, shares this criticism to some extent. 
But Lessing adds another perspective to this criticism of positive religion according to which positive religion’s claims are to be viewed much more favourably. Thus, on the one hand, Lessing is highly critical of positive religion; on the other hand, he has some sympathy for it. Or, in his own words, his struggle is to combine the head’s compulsion to be an atheist with the heart’s desire to be (a Lutheran) Christian. And the fact that he posits verdict and counsel right next to each other reflects this struggle, whereby the heart’s desire for ‘positive religion’ comes out in the counsel and the Enlightened criticism of positive religion in the verdict.
	In my view, Lessing favours here the perspective of the counsel. No doubt, being a child of the Enlightenment, the perspective of the verdict is a ‘life’ option for him as well. Yet his sympathies lie with the counsel’s mild perspective on positive religion. For this thesis speak his other writings in which he wrestles again and again with the claims of positive religion. To be sure, he does not embrace them without further ado. Yet, he does not abandon them but goes through great length in trying to re-interpret them (see above). Also, if you look for text-internal grounds, you can find them in the judge’s words as well. One such ground is that the counsel follows the verdict, thereby almost overruling it. The second is that Lessing puts more effort and fervour into the much more nuanced counsel than into the rather crude verdict. In short, I think that the judge’s counsel represents Lessing’s own stance on positive religion better than the judge’s verdict​[21]​.  
5) The interpretation of the ring-parable suggested here	
But how to interpret the judge’s counsel, thus Lessing’s own stance on positive religion? Let me begin answering that question by alluding to a ‘finding’ that is almost uncontested, viz. that the question of the truth of positive religion is left undecided or open in the judge’s counsel​[22]​. The question which of the three brothers is right, if any, i.e. which of the three religions is ‘right’, if any, is left undecided. It may come to a decision on it in the future, after ‘a thousand thousand years’ are lapsed and a wiser judge shall pass judgement. Yet, for the time being, the truth of positive religion is still undecided.  
Yet, it was suggested above that this non-decidability of the truth of positive religion does not necessarily imply that the books on religion should be closed. Holding that positive religion’s truth is non-decidable is apparently different from holding that religion is mistaken or ‘fake’ (exclusion of the ‘atheist’ interpretation alternative, 1). Nor does it imply that the cognitive dimension of religion should be sacrificed and replaced by its moral dimension (exclusion of interpretation alternative 2a, the reduction of religion to morality). Thus, the non-decidability of the question of the truth of positive religion does neither imply that its cognitive dimension should be given up nor that the religious pursuit as such should be given up. 
But how can Lessing maintain that positive religion should be pursued if its truth is undecided? The answer to that question is to take the following words of the judge’s counsel seriously: 
‘My counsel is, you take the thing
Exactly as it lies.  If each of you
Received his ring from his good father’s hand,
Then each of you believe his ring the true one’.
The counsel ‘take the thing exactly as it lies’ should be understood as endowing the believer of positive religion with an epistemic justification. In other words, I suggest that the sentence ‘Then each of you believe his ring the true one’ should be understood as being not only a descriptive statement but a normative one. It does not only depict the psychological state of the believer or something of that sort, but, rather, provides a legitimation of the right to belief in the truth of positive religion (probably under certain provisions, viz. only for the person who ‘received his ring from his good father’s hand’, that certain moral constraints are met (see above) etc.). In short, Lessing’s solution is here that although the question of the truth of religion is undecided as of yet, this does not rule out the possibility of legitimately believing in (certain) positive religious claims. 
Put differently, my suggestion is to regard the ‘punch line’ of the ring-parable to consist in the idea that positive religion is justifiable, although its truth cannot be fixed determinately here and now. Objectively, the truth of positive religion is non-decidable hic et nunc. But that does not rule out the possibility that the individual can be justified in holding a particular belief- subjectively. In sum, the current non-decidability of the truth of (positive) religion does not a priori rule out the possibility of its justifiability.
II The philosophical tenability of Lessing’s solution 
6) Is Lessing’s solution to the problem of positive religion not hopelessly inconsistent? 
You may retort now that such a treatment of positive religion is hopeless on theoretical grounds. The reason is that Lessing uses a theory of truth here that is hopeless to defend, viz. that truth can be relativized. When he judges over the three brothers, i.e. the three religions, ‘Then each of you believe his ring the true one’, he implies that there can be different truths. If this utterance entails indeed normative implications, as I have contended above, then the only way to make sense of it is to presuppose a theory that deprives the notion of truth of its universal implications. That is to say, if I am epistemically justified in believing my Christian religion to be true, while you are at the same time epistemically justified in believing your Islamic religion to be true, then a non-universalistic theory of truth must be presupposed.
	This is obvious from the simple fact that, given that Christianity entails religious beliefs competing with Islamic beliefs, the suggestion that the Christian as well as the Muslim can be epistemically justified in holding their respective beliefs to be true makes sense only if the truth-predicates applied are not universally valid. Suggesting e.g. that I am epistemically justified in holding the statement that Christ is the redeemer of humanity to be true makes sense only if you limit the validity claims of the truth-predicates applied accordingly, say, to the inside-perspective of the Christian faith or something of that sort. If you fail to do that, i.e. if you maintain a notion of truth implying universal pretensions indeed, you cannot consistently maintain at the same time that the Muslim is also epistemically justified in believing it to be true that Christ is not the redeemer of humanity. In short, Lessing’s solution to the problem of positive religion makes sense only if you relativize the attribution of truth-predicates in one way or the other, e.g. to a religious-inside perspective, a given cultural paradigm, or whatever.  
	But, you may continue your charge, the problem is that relativizing truth is impossible. The current philosophical discussion has made abundantly clear that attempts to relativize truth are impossible to maintain consistently. For example, attempts to relativize the attribution of different truth-predicates to different languages fail​[23]​. In short, Lessing’s solution to the problem of positive religion fails because it is based upon unsound philosophical grounds. 

7) Why Lessing’s solution is not inconsistent: The distinction between truth proper and justification 
I disagree with the charge that Lessing is inconsistent in the above named sense. More precisely speaking, I wish to suggest that his account of positive religion can be reconstructed in a consistent fashion. The trick is to maintain a strict demarcation between truth (proper​[24]​) and justification and interpret his account as answering to the problem of the justification of positive religion rather than to that of its truth. Let me explain, beginning with the demarcation of justification from truth proper.
	What I mean with the demarcation between the notion of justification and that of truth proper comes out in the following example​[25]​: We may be justified hic et nunc in believing that a certain sort of alternative treatment of cancer is preferable to its treatment with chemotherapy. Say, there are indications right now that it is preferable on balance since it is (almost) equally effective but has fewer side effects. Yet, the truth of that statement is not yet confirmed, say, there is not yet enough evidence available. The point is that, under certain circumstances, we can be justified in believing the alternative treatment to be the best option available although the truth of that belief is not yet determinately fixed. In short, we can be epistemically justified to believe x although x’s truth is not (yet) determined. 
	My point is now that Lessing’s account of positive religion can be reconstructed in a theoretically sound fashion if it is understood as an answer to the problem of the justification of positive religion, not to that of its truth. According to this reconstruction, Lessing grants that the truth of positive religion is undecided. Yet, he argues, this does not take away the individual’s epistemic right to maintain her particular Christian, Jewish…faith​[26]​. In short, the proper truth-predicates are not yet distributed over the relevant positive religious claims. Nevertheless, believers can be epistemically justified in holding on to their respective claims​[27]​. 
There is one implication of this solution that deserves particular attention. I mean the point that the non-decidedness of the truth of positive religion implies that its truth is open in the strict sense of the word. That is to say, contending that you are epistemically justified in holding a belief, b, although b’s truth is not yet determined, makes sense only under the provision that b could turn out to be true. That is to say, b is not definitely false, for all we can say thus far​[28]​. 
Let me quote again:
‘And when in days to come the magic powers 
Of these fair rings among your children’s children
Brighten the world, I call you once again,
After a thousand thousand years are lapsed.
Before this seat of judgment. On that day
A wiser man shall sit on it and speak’.
No matter whether you interpret those lines as contending that the question of the truth of positive religion is non-decidable as a matter of principle or whether you interpret them as holding that its truth is undecided up to now as a matter of fact – in either case, it is not implied that religion is definitely false for all we can say thus far. 
It is worth noting here in passing that it is the non-decidedness of positive religion’s claims that enables Lessing to get a notion of tolerance worth its name off the ground: Insofar as the truth of positive religion is undecided, tolerance is the ‘natural’ stance to take. For it could well be that my Christian religion will turn out to be true. But it could also be the case that your Jewish, Muslim… religion will turn out to be true. In the face of the uncertainty regarding truth we are confronted with right now, all ‘missionary’ impulses become obsolete. I have no right to impose my Christian faith upon you since I cannot be certain that my religion will turn out to be true at the end and yours will not (nota bene: A feature interesting in our current, widely atheist Western world is that the atheist has also no right to impose his lack of faith upon the believer).
III) The philosophical desirability of Lessing’s solution: Why it is preferable to tackle questions of justification rather than questions of truth in the philosophy of religion
8) In favour of a new paradigm in philosophy of religion
Thus far, I have engaged in questions of Lessing-interpretation. I have suggested that it is possible to interpret him as answering questions of justification rather than of truth proper. But I have not answered the question why it is desirable to interpret him in such a fashion. I will do that in the following by suggesting that tackling questions of justification is a more promising approach in the philosophy of religion than tackling questions of truth proper. I will call the former approach the ‘new paradigm’ (in the philosophy of religion), the latter ‘the standard paradigm’. 
The standard paradigm (in the philosophy of religion) is characterised by a focus on the question of the truth, likelihood, probability etc. of religious claims. According to it, questions of justification are ‘fall-out’ from truth-questions. That is to say, the question whether or not we are justified in holding religious claims depends on how the question of their truth… is settled. If they are true…, we are justified in holding them, if not, we are not justified. The standard paradigm thus ascribes logical priority to the question of the truth of religious claims over the question of their justifiability. 
The problem with the standard paradigm is that it leads into a dead-end street. We have exchanged arguments for the truth or falsity of religion for centuries now – yet, the result is inconclusive, in my view​[29]​. To be sure, there is a widespread consensus that the traditional proofs for the existence of God have failed. Yet, this is not a knockdown argument against religion since they can be reconstructed as arguments rather than proofs for the plausibility of theistic claims​[30]​ or as cumulative arguments for their probability​[31]​. 
And the atheist claim that religion is flawed because the theodicy-problem is insurmountable is also far from conclusive. Apart from the fact that this criticism has bearing only on certain religious claims, not on others​[32]​, it is not even a knockdown argument against the former. The theist can simply escape it by reconstructing her religious claims, e.g. by amending the notion of God presupposed appropriately. 
Other arguments for and against religion could be mentioned here as well. Yet, my point is probably clear anyway: We have waited for the crucial argument for or against religion to surface for centuries and have been disappointed. This being the case, it makes little sense to expect it to emerge in the foreseeable future. But if the question of the truth of religious claims is not decided and there is no reasonable hope that it will be decided in the foreseeable future, then it makes sense to suggest that we should stop devoting all our energy and time to answering that question. Rather, we should move on to explore new grounds. 
More precisely, we should switch paradigms in philosophy of religion. Rather than focussing solely on the standard paradigm with its idea that the justifiability of religious claims is logically dependent upon their truth, we should explore the new paradigm more closely. That is to say, we should develop a logic of decision–making in the face of the non-decidability of the question of the truth of religious claims. We should develop means to answer the question as to whether we are justified to hold on to religious claims which are independent of the question as to whether they are true or not (provided that the evidence for or against them is not conclusive either way). In short, we should switch from the standard paradigm to the new paradigm and focus on the question of the justifiability of religion. 
That is the point of the above-suggested interpretation of Lessing’s ring-parable. He contends that we can be justified in holding religious claims – provided certain constraints are met (see above, section 5)- although we are uncertain as to their truth. This idea, I take it, is worth exploring further. 
9) The new Paradigm: Lessing, William James, Alvin Plantinga and Coherentist Holism 
The new paradigm and its core idea that the question of the justifiability of religious claims can be answered in spite of the fact that their truth is not (yet) fixed may still appear to be strange. Let me rectify this appearance by demonstrating that there are other proponents of this paradigm, among them such famous thinkers as William James and the Reformed Epistemologists. In other words, the ‘new paradigm’ is not as novel as it may appear to be at first glance but has a honourable tradition going for it. 
	This paradigm’s most famous proponent is probably James with his famous article ‘The Will to Believe’. I have suggested elsewhere​[33]​ that this article should be read independently of what is usually considered to be James’ ‘definition’ of truth, viz. that truth is tantamount to ‘expediency of belief’ or something of that sort. Rather than arguing that religious claims are true, James argues that we have a right to decide in favour of holding those claims by invoking will or passion. We have this right although their truth is not fixed. 
That is to say, his considerations answer questions of justifications rather than of truth proper. He suggests that we can be justified in holding religious claims, rc, on different than truth-related grounds, viz. on grounds having to do with our will-power (respectively passion)​[34]​. Insofar as he suggests that we can be justified in holding rc although rc’s truth is not fixed, he is a proponent of the new paradigm. 
The second witness for this paradigm is the Reformed Epistemology project. Although I am in the records more for criticizing than defending Plantinga​[35]​, I would like to recant here insofar as I think that Plantinga can be read much more sympathetically than I have done thus far​[36]​ if interpreted to be an adherent of the new paradigm. That is to say, he should be reconstructed as 
-presupposing a sharp demarcation between truth and justification, and
-contributing to questions of justifications, not to those of truth proper- at least, in his discussions on the notion of foundationalism and related topics.  
Reconstructing Plantinga in this fashion makes it possible to re-evaluate his remarks on truth, e.g. the much-criticised ones in ‘Reason and Belief in God’. There, he suggests that the criteria for what can count as ‘properly basic’ must be found with the help of examples that are relevant within a particular community and that, thus, the criteria can be irreconcilably different between different communities. With regard to truth, he maintains that from the fact of such an irreconcilable difference ‘does not follow that there is no truth of the matter’​[37]​. 
Read in the light of the above suggestions concerning the new paradigm, this passage should not so much be taken to indicate Plantinga’s negligence with regard to the relativistic consequences his approach harbours concerning the notion of truth​[38]​. Rather, it should be understood as targeting questions of justification rather than of truth proper. That is to say, he should be interpreted as suggesting here that, although the truth of the Christian claims is not yet determined, one may well be justified to maintain them​[39]​ - which makes him a good defender of the new paradigm​[40]​. 
Finally, if I may be so bold to mention my own modest contributions in the same breath with those famous witnesses of the new paradigm, I would like to point to the ‘coherentist holist’-approach I have suggested​[41]​. This approach consists of the following key-elements: 
-Given that the choice between foundationalism and coherentism is an exhaustive one as far as theories of justification is concerned, coherentism is to be preferred;
-but coherentism in itself is found wanting for its incapability to accommodate realist concerns; thus it needs to be amended;
-it should be amended by pragmatist criteria, such as domain-specifically tailored ‘success-criteria’;
-from the thus amended coherentism, a particular sort of realism follows, viz. a holism. This holism implies that the whole of a certain religious belief system rather than the individual religious claim can legitimately make realist claims - provided it meets the above-mentioned criteria. 
Given the divide between theories of justification and of truth presupposed here, coherentist holism answers questions of justification rather than of truth proper​[42]​. It provides criteria as to when we are justified in holding a particular religious belief-system, rbs, but does not entitle us to hold rbs to be true in the proper sense of the word. Thus, insofar as coherentist holism provides us with a justification to hold rbs without committing us to hold rbs to be true, it is yet another witness of the new paradigm. 
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